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1Abstract
The dynamic price competition in a horizontally diﬀerentiated duo-
poly when consumers value previous market shares is analyzed. The
conditions for the existence of stable Markov-Perfect Equilibrium(MPE)
in linear strategies are established. When they exist, the optimal pric-
ing policies suggest that a ﬁrm with a higher previous market share
charges a higher price, all else equal. It is possible to observe pricing
below cost for some periods. In the steady state, the MPE leads to a
more competitive outcome (lower prices) than the case where there is
no persistence in consumer tastes. The model can produce outcomes
where the steady state is reached very slowly which provides an alterna-
tive explanation for slow emergence of competition when entrants face
an established incumbent: It may be due to persistence in consumer
tastes.
Keywords: Dynamic price competition, network externalities, fash-
ion, markov-perfect equilibrium, product diﬀerentiation.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C73, D21, D43, L13, L21.
21. Introduction
Consumers often consider the choice of the others when they face a decision
problem. When buying a computer or a software package, one informally
inquires about the choices of peers as well as consulting consumer reviews.
People quite frequently choose the box oﬃce hits when going to a movie
theater. When buying clothes, one tends to choose the fashionable items for
that time period.
Another case which most people can relate to is the choice of restaurants.
(See, for example, Becker 1991) When faced with the decision problem of
choosing a dining location, people are inclined to patronize a restaurant
which has waiting lines and high prices. Conceivably there are several factors
at work in bringing about this situation. First of all, when consumers are
not sure about the quality of food served in restaurants, the high rate of
occupancy might serve as a signal that the food is quite good. Secondly,
having shared an experience that others in one’s social circle has already
acquired might provide additional satisfaction. Therefore, it is plausible to
conjecture that, when making a decision about a restaurant, a consumer
considers her own taste for the particular kind of cuisine, the price of the
meal that she has to pay for dining there, as well as the popularity of the
restaurant.
In this paper, I will investigate the dynamics in a diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts duopoly where consumers value previous market shares. The origin
of this valuation is not spelled out; it might be due to network externali-
ties, uncertainty about the product quality or just fashion. The questions
I want to address are, how would prices and market shares evolve if such
an eﬀect were present. Vettas (1997) develop a similar model where current
3demand is positively related to the previous sales levels. He derives the
equilibrium entry path of perfectly competitive ﬁrms. The basic diﬀerence
of my model with Vettas (1997) is the market structure. In my model ﬁrms
behave strategically instead of taking prices as given.
The model in consideration consists of two symmetric ﬁrms which pro-
duce horizontally diﬀerentiated products with constant marginal cost. The
consumers live for two periods and only the old generation makes purchases.
A product diﬀerentiation model ´ a la Hotelling is adopted; in addition, the
consumers’ valuation includes a term that reﬂects the eﬀects of the previ-
ous market share of a particular brand which I refer to as persistence in
consumer tastes. At the beginning of each period, ﬁrms simultaneously
announce their prices and then the demands are resolved. Due to the per-
sistence in the demand, a ﬁrm with a high market share faces a trade oﬀ
between exploiting high valuation it receives from the consumer population
and foregoing future market share advantage due to high prices this period.
I consider linear Markov strategies for both ﬁrms and require that the
market is covered in each period. An outcome is deﬁned to be stable
when both ﬁrms have market shares between zero and one. I establish
the conditions required for the existence of a stable Markov Perfect Equi-
librium(MPE) in linear strategies. In equilibrium, a ﬁrm with a higher
previous market share charges a higher price, all else being equal. In the
steady state, the prices are below the prices which would have been quoted
in the absence of persistence in the consumer tastes. That is, when ﬁrms
consider intertemporal eﬀects of their pricing policies, a more competitive
outcome prevails. In addition, equilibrium may involve prices below cost at
some periods.
4An important point to note is the speed of convergence to the steady
state(stable) equilibrium. Often in industries which are initially dominated
by one ﬁrm, the entrants ﬁnd it diﬃcult to gain a foothold in the market. I
show that this is possible when consumers tastes are persistent, that is when
consumers value the previous market share of a ﬁrm, the penetration of a new
ﬁrm’s product in the market might be substantially slow. This outcome has
important implications, since the slow penetration of the entrant’s product
is due to consumer preferences but not on the predatory strategies followed
by incumbent ﬁrms.
The paper is organized as follows. The related literature is presented in
section 2. The model is outlined in Section 3. The analysis of the model
is presented in Section 4. I analyze the entry in a market which is initially
dominated by an incumbent in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Related Literature
The feedback eﬀect of what others do on the preferences of the consumers
may lead to endogenously changing tastes. Formal analysis of such eﬀects
can be traced back to von Weisz¨ acker (1971). He develops a model where
consumers’ current utility is eﬀected by the level of previous sales. He con-
cludes that if indeed the consumer preferences evolve endogenously, policy
decisions are better based on steady state preferences and derives conditions
on the preferences so that a steady state is achieved. Becker (1991), also
assuming positive feedback eﬀects on consumer demand, provide an expla-
nation for persistent excess demand and why prices do not increase to levels
that might clear the market in the case of restaurants.
Economists have recently been trying to provide rational explanations
5of why people coordinate their actions with others. The conceptually easi-
est explanation is found in network industries. For example, in a telephone
network one additional user substantially increases the number of potential
connections. A software package which is used by a large number users in-
duce others to adopt the same package as the possible exchanges of informa-
tion are enhanced. The more customers a network has, the more demand is
generated. Such positive feedback eﬀects are called “network externalities”.
Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) show a positive relationship between the
installed base and the retail price of software products signaling existence
of the feedback eﬀects of the type in consideration.
Another avenue that has been explored in detail recently involves uncer-
tainty and learning on consumers’ and/or ﬁrms’ side. Caminal and Vives
(1995) develop a model showing that past sales might serve as a signal of
product quality when previous prices are not observable. The consumers
might view a good which is purchased by more people as of being better
quality. Therefore, the market share of a ﬁrm may be valued positively by
the consumers when making a purchase decision. In support of this view,
Bergemann and Valim¨ aki (1997) consider a model where consumers use mar-
ket shares to update their beliefs about the quality of a new product.
Yet another strand of literature where people consider what others do
and behave accordingly is related to fashion or herd behavior. Often it
is observed that societies pass traditions, customs from one generation to
the other even if such customs are undesirable from the viewpoint of so-
cial welfare. Sometimes people just take the same actions that others have
taken regardless of their own preferences. (See for example, Banerjee 1992,
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1992)
63. The Model
Consider a duopoly which serves N customers who have diﬀerent tastes
along with a product diﬀerentiation model ´ a la Hotelling. The two ﬁrms are
located at each end of the unit interval. In the next subsection we deﬁne
consumer preferences and derive demand functions for each product. The
subsection after that will set up the ﬁrms proﬁt functions.
3.1. Consumers
I consider a consumer population which lives only two periods. Each period
N young consumers arrive to the market, and N old consumers purchase one
unit of one of the products. It is assumed that the product of ﬁrm 1 is located
at 0 and ﬁrm 2 is located at 1. Both young and old consumers are uniformly
and independently distributed along the unit interval with their positions
representing their ideal product. Every period the consuming segment (the
old) of the population changes, therefore each period there is a diﬀerent
realization of consumer locations.1
The consumers’ derive a utility of V for consuming their ideal product
which would have been located at the same point with them on the unit
interval. They incur a transportation cost for having to consume one of
the available brands instead of their ideal brand. The per unit travel cost
is denoted by 1=2s.2 They also incur a disutility due to the price paid for
1This assumptions on the consumer population aims to capture the fact that consumers
tastes may change through time. One could make repeat purchases, but the needs and
tastes of a consumer might change during the time between purchases.
2Observe that s here provides a measure of substitutability between both brands. When
s ! 1, the transportation cost approaches to zero, therefore both brands become close
substitutes. On the other hand for s ! 0, the transportation cost approaches inﬁnity,
7purchasing.
In addition to this standard horizontal diﬀerentiation model, the cus-
tomers have a perceived component in their valuation which represents the
eﬀect of fashion or a valuation of the market penetration of the product.
Throughout the text, this component is referred as persistence in consumer
tastes. This eﬀect is assumed to be a linear function of the previous market
share, i.e the valuation of the previous market share enters the consumers’
utility function as amt1
j ; (j = 1;2); where a is measure of the strength of
this valuation. This could be viewed as a signal of the product’s quality,3
network externalities,4 or some other attribute which leads to a given level
of popularity.
Let us denote the price of ﬁrm j at period t by pt
j and the previous
market share by mt1
j , for j = 1;2. Then, the valuation of the customer
located at the point  for product j at period t is
Ut(;pt
j;mt1






where Fj 2 f0;1g is the location of ﬁrm j and a  0 represents the strength
therefore consumers prefer the closest brand independent of their prices.
3For example, let the quality of a product be either V or V + a. People will buy a
product either because it is of higher quality or it is substantially cheaper. Therefore, the
consumers of ﬁrm 1, purchase the product either because they believe the product to be
of quality V + a or of quality V but it is much cheaper than the alternative. Therefore,
the high quality product belongs to ﬁrm 1 with probability m
t1
1 or to ﬁrm 2, in which
case ﬁrm 1 has a product of quality V , with probability 1m
t1
1 . Therefore the expected
quality of the product of ﬁrm 1 is given by V + am
t1
1 .
4If this valuation is thought to be due to network externalities, this approach provides
an adaptive expectations model of externalities. That is, consumers use the previous mar-
ket share to estimate the expected network beneﬁts, and in steady state these expectations
are correct.
8of the valuation of the previous market share and it is assumed to be time-
invariant.5
Every period each customer consumes one unit of the product which
provides the highest value. That is, the customer located at  chooses
product j if and only if
U(;pt
j;mt1
j ) > U(;pt
j;mt1
j );
where j represents the other product. Following the standard procedure,
I look for the location of the indiﬀerent customer, ˜ , to ﬁnd the expected
demand functions for each product. Observe that all the customers to the
left of ˜  consume product 1 while customers to the right prefer product 2.
As every period the consuming segment of the population is changing,6 and
the actual location of each customer is private information, the ﬁrms can
only calculate expected demands.
Depending on the values of parameters there are several possible market
conﬁgurations, such as one ﬁrm cornering the market, or both ﬁrms produc-
ing but the market not being fully covered. The other possibility is both
ﬁrms produce and the market is covered. I will concentrate on the latter
case where mt
2 = 1  mt
1. This requires V to be large relative to 1=2s. In
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5Clearly, this is a strong assumption. Even though the consumers are diﬀerent each
period, the preference parameters are assumed to be constant through time. However, it
is possible to imagine that young consumers inherit these preference parameters from the
old.
6Recall that only the old consumers make purchases.
93.2. The ﬁrms
For simplicity, I assume ﬁrms incur zero marginal costs, however, this as-




















The competition has inﬁnite horizon, and ﬁrms have a common discount
factor . Each ﬁrm maximizes the expected value of the proﬁt streams.
The objective function of each ﬁrm is given by
Πt
j(mt1









; j = 1;2: (6)
The demand is resolved after the prices are announced, therefore the expec-
tation is taken at the beginning of each period.
4. The Analysis
The underlying strategic interaction is dynamic, implying a multitude of
possible outcomes in equilibrium. However, it is useful to brieﬂy discuss
the incentives a ﬁrm faces when choosing its price in the beginning of the
period. Inspection of (2) and (3) reveals that a ﬁrm with a market share
larger than a half faces a higher demand function due to the valuation of
previous market shares by consumers. Therefore, a ﬁrm might be able to
sustain a high price at a given period, but choosing a higher price may
7In fact, when the marginal costs of both ﬁrms are the same, our model will provide
the same results if one views the strategic variable p
t
j as the markup above cost instead
of prices.
10decrease market share leading to a lower demand in the future. Hence, in
equilibrium the contrasting incentives of higher proﬁts this periods versus
lower demand in the future must be balanced. An equilibrium concept that
incorporates this intertemporal nature of the decision problem will be an
appropriate choice.
I will, therefore, concentrate on one particular kind of equilibrium, namely,
Markov Perfect Equilibrium(MPE) as introduced by Maskin and Tirole
(1987). In a MPE, strategies are only functions of the payoﬀ relevant in-
formation, that is, the strategies are only functions of the relevant physical
state of the world, which, in this case is the previous market share of ﬁrm
one. In the context of this paper, a MPE can formally be deﬁned as below.
Deﬁnition 1. Markov Perfect Equilibrium
A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is a pair of functions from the state space
M = [0;1], to the space of all possible prices, P  R. Formally, let p1 :
M ! P and p2 : M ! P be two functions. Also let Vj(mt
1),(j=1,2), be
the value of the game starting at period t + 1 where both players play their
optimal price policies. p1 and p2 constitute a MPE if and only if
V1(mt1






















The model posited above falls in to the category of linear-quadratic
games which has been studied in detail. (See, for example, Basar and Oldser
1982) The strategic variable of each ﬁrm is the price and the physical state
of the system is summarized by the previous market share. The per period
11proﬁt function is quadratic-concave in the price(the strategic variable), and
the state (market share) evolves as a linear function of the actions(prices)









1 ) = l2 + k2(1  mt1
1 ):
If one can ﬁnd coeﬃcients (l1;l2;k1;k2) which are consistent with maximiza-
tion, leads to non-negative proﬁts for both ﬁrms and, in addition, lead to
a market structure where the market is covered, then the policy functions
above will constitute a MPE. Given the linear-quadratic nature of the prob-
lem, the ﬁrst order conditions(FOCs) will be necessary and suﬃcient. The
solutions of the maximization problems are provided in the appendix.
Lemma 1. The parameters (l1;l2;k1;k2) which satisfy the ﬁrst order con-














There are more than one possible (l;k) pair which satisfy the ﬁrst order
conditions. However, there are additional requirements for (l;k) to consti-
tute a MPE of the price competition. It is needed that at every period the
market is fully covered and both ﬁrms have non-negative market shares. If







1  1)(a  k): (9)





1  1)(a  k)  1
There are two cases that has to be considered.
Case 1. a  k: In this case, the expected market share is increasing in the
previous market share, therefore we need




Case 2. a < k Since the expected market share is decreasing in the previous
market share for this case, we need




Combining (10) and (11)leads to
(k) :=j 2s(a  k) j 1: (12)
One can refer to (12) as the condition for stability, as it is required to hold
for market shares to remain in [0;1] for all possible previous market share
values and hence all possible prices. In the remainder of the text, (k) is





1 )  mss
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13therefore, the steady state outcome is symmetric.
Another requirement is that each ﬁrm should prefer producing. This is
possible when both ﬁrms have non-negative expected proﬁts. Formally, it is
necessary that Πt
j(mt1
1 )  0 for j = 1;2, since otherwise, by staying out of
the market (for example by setting pt
j = 1), a ﬁrm may achieve zero proﬁt.
Let X = f(a;s;)ja 2 R+;s 2 R+ and 0    1g be the set of
the parameters of the model, and denote a typical element of X by x. The
following deﬁnition characterizes a stable MPE of dynamic price competition
in linear strategies where the market is covered at every time period.
Deﬁnition 2. For every x 2 X, a MPE in linear strategies where each
period the market is covered has parameters (l;k) that satisfy the FOCs,
the stability condition (12), and leads to Πt
j(mt1
1 )  0, for j = 1;2, and
0  mt1
1  1,as deﬁned in (6).
Before proceeding with the main result, it is useful to partition the set
of parameters as follows:
E1
1 := fx j x 2 X; and; as < 1
2
3
1+; and; 0   < 1
3g;
E2





3    1g;
E3








3    1g;




E2 := fx j x 2 X; 1
2
3
1+  as 
q

; and;     1g;
E := fx j x 2 E1 [ E2g
IE := fx j x 2 X n Eg;




3 and  = 2
p
33. As stated in the following proposi-
tion, the sets E1
1, E2
1, E3
1 and E2 deﬁne the parameters where a stable MPE
in linear strategies exists. In each of these sets the price policies exhibit
14diﬀerent behavior. In ﬁgure 1, these sets are presented visually. Notice that
both E3
1 and E2 are relatively smaller than all other sets.
Figure 1: The Partition of the Parameter Set
































Proposition 1. Existence of stable Markov Perfect Equilibrium in
linear strategies (LSMPE)
a. For all x 2 E 0  (k)  1.
b. There exists a unique LSMPE for x 2 E1 with k > 0 and
i) l  0, if x 2 E1
1 [ E2
1,
ii) l < 0, if x 2 E3
1.
15c. There are two sets of (l;k) pairs which lead to a LSMPE for x 2 E2
with k > 0 and l < 0.
d. For x 2 IE, there exists no LSMPE.
Proof. See Appendix.
The fact that k  0 for x 2 E implies that a ﬁrm with a higher market
share in the previous period will charge a higher price than a ﬁrm with a
smaller market share would, everything else being equal. This result is con-
sistent with the observation of higher prices charged by popular brands. In
addition, for the cases where l < 0, it is possible to observe negative(below
cost) prices when a ﬁrm has a lower market share in the previous period.
Such practices, that is below cost pricing, are quite common in many in-
dustries. Often, an entrant oﬀers introductory prices, free samples or even
explicit subsidies to penetrate the market, for example, in software industry
or mobile telecommunications industry.
For large values of the product of popularity and substitutability, as, a
MPE in linear strategies where the market is covered cannot be sustained.
The largest permissible value of as is attained when  ! 0, and even then
it is required that as < 3=2. Moreover, for  ! 1, the set of possible pa-
rameters for which a LSMPE exists shrinks considerably. When x 2 IE,
the endogeneity of the demands leads to unstable outcomes. This unsta-
bility stems from the particular deﬁnition that I employed which requires
both ﬁrms to have market shares in [0;1] each period. It might be possible
to derive equilibrium strategies where the ﬁrms explicitly account for the
constraint that their market shares should remain in between zero and one,
but we do not extend the analysis in this direction in the present context.
However, my conjecture is that, for x 2 IE, the market will be cornered by
16one ﬁrm, that is de facto standardization will occur.
It is interesting to note that the existence results depends on the product
of a, the magnitude of the valuation of previous market shares, and s the
substitutability between the brands. As two brands become more and more
close substitutes, it becomes more diﬃcult to sustain an equilibrium outcome
even with small magnitudes of persistence in demand.
Proposition 2. Steady State Prices












It is easy to see from (7) that k ! 0 when a ! 0. Therefore, in the
absence of any persistence in the demand function the MPE of the dy-
namic price competition would entail charging prices that are equal to the
transportation cost. If the ﬁrms were operating in an industry where there
are no persistence in demand, the transportation cost would have been the
equilibrium price of the dynamic interaction. Surprisingly, introduction of
the valuation of the previous market shares by the consumers decreases
the prices charged by the ﬁrms below the transportation cost. Therefore,
the equilibrium, that is derived here, of the dynamic price competition in
an environment with persistence in the demand involves more competitive
behavior. This points out a very interesting phenomenon: Competition be-
tween two brands which exhibit externalities or fashion eﬀects will be more
intense than two brands which do not possess such eﬀects. The mechanism
leading to such a result is due to the incentives of both ﬁrms to cut prices
17to gain future market share advantage. Indeed, a ﬁrm with a market share
slightly above one half does not enjoy any signiﬁcant valuation due to persis-
tence this period and have incentives to cut prices to face a higher demand
next period. At the same time, the other ﬁrm has even stronger incentives
to cut prices this period since it has a market share below one half leading
to a lower demand. In equilibrium, when such incentives are balanced, the
resulting prices are much lower. Similar results showing that the MPE might
involve more competitive behavior is also shown by Jun and Vives (1998) in
a diﬀerent context.
This more competitive outcome is in sharp contrast with for example
markets with switching costs where the intertemporal nature of the decision
problem allows ﬁrms to sustain high(close to perfectly collusive) prices.(See
for example, Beggs and Klemperer (1992), Padilla (1995)) The reason behind
this diﬀerence is that in this model the feedback eﬀects are eliminated when
both ﬁrms serve close to half of the market and hence they have incentives
to cut prices to enhance future demand. In models with switching costs,
however, a ﬁrm always have captive consumers, therefore, the incentives to
exploit these locked-in consumers are always present.
5. Entry
As discussed in the previous section, the competition in the presence of
persistence in consumer tastes is rather intense. In this section, I will analyze
the evolution of market shares when a ﬁrm dominates the market initially.
Let us, ﬁrst, consider the time required to reach steady state. First
assume that (l;k) leads to a LSMPE. Let m0 > 1=2 be the initial market








where (k) = 2s(a  k). And deﬁne an -neighborhood of the steady state
as [1=2;1=2+] recalling that mss
1 = 1=2. The next proposition provides
a lower bound for the expected number of periods that is required for the
market share of the incumbent to decrease to an -neighborhood of mss
1 =
1=2 where  < m0  1=2.
Proposition 3. Rate of Convergence
For  < m0 1=2, the expected number of time periods, , which is required










Clearly, as (k) ! 1, the time required to reach an -neighborhood of the
steady state market share increases indeﬁnitely. This provides an alternative
explanation of the hardships that entrants face in order to penetrate a mar-
ket. In this case, contrary to the common belief that the diﬃculties faced
by the entrants are caused by predatory strategies of incumbent ﬁrms, the
slow penetration is due to the interaction between consumers’ preferences
and the discount rate.
In the model, consumers’ taste parameters(locations) are changing from
period to period, since the consumer population changes every period. This
fact, combined with a stability factor near one implies that the market leader
might change in a particularly biased realization of consumer tastes. If in
19one period, for some external reason which is not modeled here, a larger
population prefers a particular brand, then the dominance of the producer
of this brand might prevail for quite a long time. This fact can explain why
one observes fashion cycles where diﬀerent ﬁrms are dominant in a periodic
manner.
It is useful to simulate the equilibrium outcomes for some parameter
values to get a feeling for the dynamics of the market shares and prices.
When (k) is close to zero, prices and market shares converge to their steady
state values rather quickly and exhibit oscillations with a small magnitude,
therefore the results are not too interesting. However, when (k) ! 1, the
model produces striking results as the shocks have long lived eﬀects.
I have chosen s = 1, N = 1000, m0 = 1 and  = 0:05. Every period the
consuming population is randomly located by means of a uniform random
number generator. Then, given the prices and the previous market shares of
the ﬁrms, each consumer is assigned to the ﬁrm which provides the higher
value. The realized market share of a ﬁrm can be calculated as a ratio of
the customers of a particular ﬁrm to the total number of consumers.
Case 1. a = 1:099 and  = 0:25
The parameters of the model are in the set E1
1. The parameters of the equi-
librium strategies in this case are given by l = 0:0002 and k = 0:6001 and
the stability factor becomes (0:6001) = 0:9978. The expected time to reach
the steady state in this case is 1701 periods. The expected proﬁts of the
ﬁrms are given by Π0
1(1) = 798:45 and Π0
2(1) = 0:00052. Clearly, the early
advantage of ﬁrm 1 translates in to much higher expected proﬁts. The mar-
ket share and price dynamics are presented in Figures 2 and 3, respectively.
An occasional shock to consumer tastes, that biases the population towards
20one brand, has long lived eﬀects. One such shocks can be observed around
t = 700 and, resulting in ,what one might call, a fashion cycle. For about
a thousand periods the entrant remains as the market leader and around
t = 1800 the incumbent again captures of half the market.
Case 2. a = 0:555 and  = 0:9
The parameters, in this case, are in the set E2. Therefore there are two
possible (l;k) pairs which can be sustained in equilibrium. The parameters
of the equilibrium strategies in this case are given by l = 0:0024(0:0153)
and k = 0:0577(0:3151) and the stability factors turn out to be (0:0577) =
0:9946 and (0:3151) = 0:4798. For k = 0:3151, only six periods are needed
to get in a 0:05-neighborhood of the steady state, while for k = 0:0577 the
number of periods becomes 687. The expected proﬁts of the ﬁrms are given
by Π0
1(1) = 526:20(957:88) and Π0
2(1) = 0:0381(560:43). With the larger
value of k the steady state is reached very quickly and the steady state price
is pss = 0:1423 which is still much lower than 1
2s = 0:5. I will present the
dynamics for k = 0:0577 in Figures 4 and 5, respectively. Observe the below
cost pricing by the entrant in the beginning of competition. Also in this case,
the market leader changes by a strong shock on the consumer tastes; two
such instances are observed at around t = 600 and t = 900. It is interesting
to note that the price process resembles an autoregressive stochastic process.
And since the coeﬃcient (k) is closed to one in this case, a shock drastically
biasing the tastes of the consumer population has long lived eﬀects.
21Figure 2: Market Share Dynamics (a = 1:099,  = 0:25)



















Figure 3: Price Dynamics (a = 1:099,  = 0:25)



























22Figure 4: Market Share Dynamics (a = 0:555 and  = 0:9)



















Figure 5: Price Dynamics (a = 0:555 and  = 0:9)




























I have analyzed price competition in a duopoly when customers value the
previous market share. The conditions for the existence of a stable MPE in
linear strategies where the market is covered at each period are established.
One feature of equilibrium price policies is that a ﬁrm with a high market
share will choose higher prices. This prediction well ﬁts with empirical
observations of the higher prices charged by popular ﬁrms.
The existence of equilibrium depends on the product of the magnitude
of feedback eﬀects and the substitutability of the available brands. A stable
MPE exists only when this product is suﬃciently low, and for high values
of this product a stable equilibrium does not exist. When this product is
closed to its boundary value and the discount factor is suﬃciently large, a
ﬁrm with a very low market share chooses a price below cost to gain market
share next period.
It is also interesting to note that, in the steady state, ﬁrms choose prices
which are below the prices that might have been chosen in the absence of
persistent consumer tastes. These eﬀects make the market share a very im-
portant strategical variable for a ﬁrm. Therefore, the presence incentives of
gaining future market share for both ﬁrms, leads to ﬁercer price competition
driving the prices down in the steady state.
I have introduced a concept of stability which relies on a shared market
structure. The evolution of markets shares are governed by a parameter
which is referred to as the coeﬃcient of stability in the text. The convergence
to the steady state levels of market shares (prices) may be substantially slow
after a shock to the consumer preferences if this coeﬃcient has a value closer
to one. Therefore, the emergence of a competitive market structure may take
24a long time in markets where there is persistence on the demand side.
There are several possible extensions of the model. Diﬀerent magnitudes
of the persistence eﬀects for each product may lead to asymmetric steady
state outcomes. It would be interesting to analyze a model where ﬁrms
control the popularity of their brands through costly advertising. Another
possible extension is negative persistence eﬀects, that is the case where the
wide spread consumption of a product decreases its value. This may provide
a framework for the analysis of competition in the markets for luxury goods.
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27Appendix
Derivation of the Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Both ﬁrms solve the maximization problems
V1(mt1























Since the ﬁrms consider the expected demands at the beginning of each
period, the expectation is dropped by using the expressions for the expected
proﬁts each period. In equilibrium, the value functions satisfy
Vj(mt1
























for j = 1;2, and V 0
j(x) = (@=@x)Vj(x). In addition, by using the equilibrium
condition (15), one can relate V 0(mt
1) and V 0(mt+1


















































28for j = 1;2. V 0
j(mt+1
1 ) can be calculated by moving the time index one
period further in (16), and substitute this in to (17). This provides us
with the euler equations for both ﬁrms. Both equations in (17) can be re-
duced to a function of mt1






1), the optimal policy functions of the
form pj(mt
1) = lj + kjmt






1 ), and pj(mt1
1 ) = lj + kjmt1
1 . It is easy to
verify that both function are linear in mt1
1 , therefore by equating the coef-
ﬁcients of mt1
1 , and the constants and after rearranging, the following four
equations in (l1;l2;k1;k2) are obtained:
(k2 + 2k1  2a)

 s2(k2  2a)(k2 + k1  2a)2 = 0 (18)
(2k2 + k1  2a)

 s2(k1  2a)(k2 + k1  2a)2 = 0 (19)

sl2 + sk2  2sl1  as + :5
s
s(k2  2a)(sk2 + sk1  2as  1)(l2  l1) (20)
+s2(k2  a)(k2  2a)2 + s2(k2  a)(k2  2a)k1
+:5(sk1  sk2  1)(k2  2a) = 0

2sl2 + 2sk2  sl1  as  :5
s
s(k1  2a)(sk2 + sk1  2as  1)(l2  l1) (21)
+k1s2(k2  a)(k2  4a)  2as2(k2  a)(k2  2a)
+s2k2
1(k2  a) + :5(sk1  sk2 + 1)(k1  2a) = 0
29Lemma 1. The parameters (l1;l2;k1;k2) which satisfy the ﬁrst order con-














Proof. Subtracting (19) from (18), amounts to
(k2  k1)

= s2(k2  k1)(k2 + k1  2a)2 (24)
Therefore k1 and k2 must be equal for (18) and (19) to hold for all
parameter values, that is k1 = k2 = k. One can ﬁnd the value of k by
solving (22) which is derived by substituting k1 = k2 = k in (18) or (19).
Now, adding (20) and (21), then substituting k1 = k2 = k and simplify-
ing, one obtains
4s2(k  2a)(k  a)  2s(k  2a)  3





 4s2(k  a)2(k  2a) = 0:
it is easy to check that second line of (25) is equal to (22), hence is zero.
Therefore, (25) holds for all parameter values if and only if l1 = l2. After
substituting k1 = k2 = k and l1 = l2 = l in to the diﬀerence of (20) and
(21), it is easy to check that l is given by (23). 
It is useful to rewrite (22) as











 4s2(3k  5a)(k  a);
and
f00(k) = 8s2(3k  4a):
Lemma 2. The only possible solutions of (22) which satisfy j (k) j 1 are
such that k 2 I1 = [a  1=2s;2a=3], and I1 is nonempty only for as  3=2.
Moreover, k 2 I1 ) 0  (k)  1.
Proof. For the market shares to remain in [0;1] for every previous market
share, it is needed that j 2s(a  k) j 1 or equivalently k 2 [a  1=2=s;a +
1=2=s]. Observe ﬁrst of all that f2(k)  0 for k  2a, and f1(k)  0 for
k  2a=3. Therefore, the only candidates for solutions of (22) lies in either
I1 = [a  1=2=s;2a=3] or I2 = [2a;a + 1=2=s]. For, as > 1=2, I2 is empty,
hence a root of f(k) can be in I2 only if as  1=2. It is easy to verify
f0(2a) > 0 and f00(k) < 0 for k 2 I2. For there to be a root in I2, it is
needed that f(a + 1=2=s) < 0. However,
f(a + 1=2=s) =
1
2
2as(1  ) + 3  
s
> 0;
for all 0    1, therefore there is no root of f(k) in I2.
The only possible roots which leads to (k)  1, then, must be in I1
which is nonempty only when as  3=2. The largest possible value of k
in this case is 2a=3, which implies 0  (k) = 2s(a  k) and since (k)
decreases with k, the smallest value of k leads to (a  1
2s) = 1. Therefore
0  (k)  1, for k 2 I1. 




2, there is a unique root of f(k) in I1.
Proof. Observe ﬁrst of all that f(2a=3) > 0, and f00(k) > 0 when k 2 I1.
Therefore, there can only be one root of f(k) in I1, if f(a  1=2=s) < 0. It


















and  >  = 2
p









) > as, f(k) has no roots in I1 for every 0    1.
Proof. Since as  1
2
3
1+, f(a1=2=s)  0. If for k < 2a=3 the minimum of
f(k) > 0 , then f(k) has no roots when k < 2a=3; observe that f00(k) > 0 in












4as(4a2s2 + 27) 
p
(4a2s2 + 9)(18 + 8a2s2)
54s2 :
Then f(kmin) > 0, whenever
4as(4a2s2 + 27) >
p
(4a2s2 + 9)(18 + 8a2s2): (27)
By squaring both both sides of (27), and simplifying the condition for
f(kmin) > 0 becomes
16a4s42 + 72a2s2  27 > 0;




3 =  = :34808. Hence, for as >
p
=, there are no roots of f(k) when k < 2a=3. Also for as > 3=2, I1 is
empty, therefore for min(3=2;
p
=) > as, f(k) has no roots in I1.






3=4, f(k) has two roots to the left of k = 2a=3 for as <
p
=. It is




1+. For as > 1
2
3
1+, there are two possibilities. Since, f(a 1
2s) > 0
in this case, either both roots are in I1, or both of them are smaller than
a  1
2s. Both roots fall in I1 only if the minimum is attained in I1, which
would be the case when kmin > a  1=2s since it is already shown that


























One can verify that for  <  = 2
p












































33Lemma 5. All the possible solutions of (22) which leads to 0  (k)  1
are positive.
Proof. First recall that f(2a=3) > 0. In addition, k can be negative only









Therefore, for as < 1=2 there is only one possible solution of k. Then if
f(0) < 0, this root must be in [0;2a=3], since f(2a=3) > 0. Evaluating f(k)











Since the right hand side of the above inequality decreases in , the smallest
value it can take, 1=2, is obtained when  = 1, and hence f(0) < 0 holds




























l  0. Otherwise, l > 0.





34When as > 1
2
3
1+, kl=0 < a  1
2s, therefore when f(k) has two roots in I1,



















Therefore, f(kl=0) < 0 will imply that the solution of the root of f(k) is
larger than kl=0 and hence l < 0. Observe that
f(kl=0) =
(2as(1 + ) +   3)(4as(as  1)(1 + ) + 3  1)
s(1  )3 :
Since (2as(1 + ) +   3) < 0 for as < 1
2
3
1+, it is needed that (4as(as 




























which holds whenever   1
3. 
The fact that l < 0 may be true raises the possibility of non-positive
prices at some periods when the previous market share is closed to zero.
Consequently, this may cause ﬁrms to have non-positive expected proﬁts,
therefore it is needed to check whether ﬁrms obtain non-negative proﬁts
in equilibrium. When the ﬁrms play their aﬃne price policies with the

















Observe that 1  m1(t;m0) = m1(t;1  m0). Then, the value functions of









i1(l + k(1  m1(i  1;m0)))(1  m1(i;m0));
therefore V2(m0) = V1(1  m0). Hence, it is suﬃcient to analyze V1(m0) as








k(1 + (k)2)(1  (k)) + 2l(1  (k)2)





(1  (k))(k(1  (k)2) + 2l(1  (k)2))
(1  )(1  (k))(1  (k)2)
:
Lemma 7. For m0  1=2, V1(m0)  V2(m0).
Proof. It is easy to check that
V1(m0)  V2(m0) =
1
2
(2m0  1)((2l + k)(k) + k)
1  (k)
: (31)
For l  0, (31) is clearly positive. For l < 0, it is needed that (2l+k)(k)+
k > 0, or after substituting the values of (k) and l in terms of k
(2a  k)(1  2s(a  k)) > 0;
which holds for k < 2a=3 and 2s(a  k) < 1. 
36Lemma 8. V1(0)  0.




(1  (k))(k(1  (k)2) + 2l(1  (k)2))
(1  )(1  (k))(1  (k)2)
: (32)
Hence it is needed that h1(k) = k(1  (k)2) + 2l(1  (k)2)  0, which
trivially holds for l  0. Substituting the values of l and (k) in terms of k
in h1(k), one obtains
h1(k) =
1  2s(a  k)
s
h2(k);
where h2(k) = 2s2(a  k)(2a  k) + sk  1, which is quadratic concave
in k. If h2(0)  0 and h2(2a=3)  0, then for any k 2 [0;2a=3], h2(k)  0.
Clearly, h1(k) > 0 whenever h2(k) > 0, since
12s(ak)
s > 0 holds always for
0  2s(ak)  1. It is also only necessary to consider k, such that f(k) = 0,
 > 1=3 and as <
q

, since otherwise l > 0 and therefore V1(0)  0.












4 for all 0    1, it holds always. Therefore,
h2(0) > 0.





























37and hence h2(2a=3) > 0 for all parameters that might lead to k in I1 and
l < 0. Since h2(k) is quadratic concave in I1, h2(0) > 0 and h2(2a=3) > 0,
h2(k) > 0 for all k 2 [0;2a=3] such that l < 0 and hence V1(0)  0. 
Lemma 9. @V1
@m0(0) > 0:
Proof. The derivative of V1(m0) at m0 = 0 is given by the coeﬃcient of m0






k(1 + (k)2)(1  (k)) + 2l(1  (k)2)
(1  (k)2)(1  (k)
;
which again is trivially positive whenever l  0. It is, therefore, only nec-
essary to check for the parameter values which may lead to l < 0. Let us
introduce
g1(k) = k(1 + (k)2)(1  (k)) + 2l(k)(1  (k)2):
Clearly @V1
@m0(0) > 0, whenever g1(k) > 0. It is easy to verify, after substi-
tuting the values of l and (k), that g1(k) = (1  2s(a  k))g2(k), with
g2(k) = 4s2(ka)2(k2a)+4ks(ka)(k2a). It is clear that g1(k) > 0
whenever g2(k) > 0. Observe that 4s2(ka)2(k2a) = f2(k) and since
only values of k such that f2(k) = f1(k) are of interest, one can rewrite
g2(k) as
g2(k) = f1(k) + 4ks(k  a)  (k  2a) = 2k(1  2s(a  k)):
Therefore g2(k) > 0 for all k > 0 and 2s(a  k) < 1. 
Lemma 10. Vj(m0)  0, for all 0  m0  1, and j = 1;2.
Proof. By lemma 8, V1(0) is positive, and by lemma 9, V1(m0) is increasing
at m0 = 0. Observe in (30) that V1 is a quadratic convex function of m0,
38therefore V1(m0) > V1(0) > 0 for 0  m0  1. Since V2(m0) = V1(1  m0),
V2(m0) is also positive for all 0  m0  1. 
Let us deﬁne the following sets:
E1
1 := fx j x 2 X; and; as < 1
2
3
1+; and; 0   < 1
3g
E2





3    1g
E3








3    1g




E2 := fx j x 2 X; 1
2
3
1+  as 
q

; and;     1g
E := fx j x 2 E1 [ E2g
IE := fx j x 2 X n Eg
Proposition 1. Existence of stable Markov Perfect Equilibrium in
linear strategies (LSMPE)
a. For all x 2 E 0  (k)  1.
b. There exists a unique LSMPE for x 2 E1 with k > 0 and
i) l  0, if x 2 E1
1 [ E2
1,
ii) l < 0, if x 2 E3
1.
c. There are two sets of (l;k) pairs which lead to a LSMPE for x 2 E2
with k > 0 and l < 0.
d. For x 2 IE, there exists no LSMPE.
Proof.
a) This follows from lemma (2).
b)The uniqueness of k follows from lemma (3) and while positivity is proved
39in (5). In lemma (6), it is shown that for x 2 E1
1 [ E2
1, l is also positive,
while for x 2 E3
1, l is negative. Both ﬁrms achieve nonnegative expected
proﬁts by lemma 10. Therefore there is a unique pair (l;k) which leads to a
LSMPE.
c) It is shown in lemma 4 there are two possible values of k that satisfy the
FOCs and stability requirement when x 2 E2. The positivity of k again
follows from lemma 5 and negativity of l is shown in lemma 6. Both ﬁrms
have non-negative expected proﬁts by lemma 10, hence both (l;k) pairs can
be sustained as a LSMPE.
d) When x 2 IE, there are no possible solutions of the FOCs which satisfy
stability requirement, and therefore there exists no LSMPE. 
Proposition 2. Steady State Prices








Moreover, 0 < pss
1  1
2s.
Proof. Recall that the steady state market share of each ﬁrm is 1=2 and
since prices of both ﬁrms are given by
pt
j = l + kmt1






























Since 0  (1  
(k)
2 ) < 1, it is clear that pss  1
2s. To show that pss > 0,
let us ﬁrst note that pss < 0, if




40One needs to consider only the case where kpn > a 1













Therefore, pss can be negative only when f(k) has two roots in I1. If one
can show that f(kpn) > 0 and further f0(kpn) < 0, then both roots of f(k)
must be larger than kpn. It easy to verify that
f(kpn) =
4as2  3 + 4(as  1)2
s3
=
4(as  1)2 + 4(as  1) + 
s3

4(as  1)2 + 4(as  1) + 2
s3
=
(2(as  1) + )2
s3  0:
Calculating f0(kpn) results in
f0(kpn) =
4a2s22 + 16as + 3  12
2 :






















the desired results obtains. 
Proposition 3. Rate of Convergence
For  < m0 1=2, the expected number of time periods, , which is required










0) is in an -neighborhood of the steady state when
j m1(t;m1
0  1=2 j< ;






Taking logarithms of both sides and then dividing both sides by
log(k) < 0
yields
 >
log 
m0 1
2
log((k))
:

42